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ST ATE SECRETS AND EXECUTIVE 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
Christina E. Wells* 
INTRODUCTION 
Observers have criticized the state secrets privilege for some 
time. Although ostensibly a common law privilege designed to 
prevent disclosure of certain evidence potentially damaging to 
national security,1 critics argue that it has morphed into a device 
by which the federal government maintains nearly total secrecy 
about its actions. It does so, they claim, because officials have 
convinced courts to defer to their argument that certain evidence 
must be suppressed2 or, more invidiously, because officials have 
convinced courts to dispose of lawsuits altogether, prior to 
discovery occurring at all. 3 As a result, critics argue that 
improper use of the privilege interferes with constitutional and 
statutory rights,4 prevents public scrutiny of the government's 
* Enoch H. Crowder Professor of Law, University of Missouri School of Law. 
Thanks to Bryan Utter who provided valuable research for the essay. I am also grateful 
to Heidi Kitrosser who organized the symposium and offered valuable insights on the 
essay. Finally, I want to thank the participants of the University of Kansas School of Law 
"National Security and Individual Liberty" symposium, at which an earlier version of this 
essay was presented. 
1. See, e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1953) (discussing the "well­
established . . .  privilege against revealing military secrets"). 
2. See, e.g., LOUIS FISHER, IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY: UNCHECKED 
POWER AND THE REYNOLDS CASE 257 (2006); Paul M. Schwartz, Warrantless 
Wiretapping, FISA Reform and the Lessons of Public Liberty: A Comment on Holmes's 
Jorde Lecture, 97 CAL. L. REV. 407, 429 (2009); William G. Weaver & Robert M. Pallitto, 
State Secrets and Executive Power, 120 POL. SCI. Q. 85, 101 (2005); Rita Glasionov, Note, 
In Furtherance of Transparency and Litigants' Rights: Reforming the State Secrets 
Privilege, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 458, 460 (2009); Aziz Huq, Dangerous Discretion, State 
Secrets, and the El-Masri Rendition Case, JURIST, Mar. 12, 2007, http://www. 
brennancenter.org/content/resource/dangerous_discretion_state_secrets_and_the_el_mas 
ri_rendi tion_case/. 
3. See, e.g., Amanda Frost, The State Secrets Privilege and Separation of Powers, 75 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1931, 1939-40 (2007); Huq, supra note 2; Carrie Newton Lyons, The 
State Secrets Privilege: Expanding Its Scope Through Government Misuse, 11 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 99, 117-22 (2007); D.A. Jeremy Telman, Our Very Privileged Executive: 
Why the Judiciary Can (and Should) Fix the State Secrets Privilege, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 499, 
500 (2007). 
4. See Lyons, supra note 3, at 123 (arguing that the misuse of the privilege frees 
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actions,5 and harms our system of separated powers because 
courts abdicate their role as a check on executive action. 6 
Critics of the Bush Administration also argued that it 
invoked the privilege with greater frequency and to more 
draconian effect than previous administrations. 7 Specifically, 
Bush officials sought dismissal of entire lawsuits claiming that 
the subject matter of the lawsuit was itself a state secret. 8 
Substantial debate exists regarding the precise nature of the 
Bush Administration's use of the privilege. 9 Nevertheless, the 
the government of the consequences of its statutory and constitutional violations); 
Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 2, at 90-91 (listing instances in which the privilege 
prevented citizen litigation). 
5. See Richard Abel, Forecasting Civil Litigation, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 425, 436 
(2009) ("The imperial Bush presidency has invoked doctrines of executive privilege, state 
secrets, and sovereign immunity to defeat efforts to expose and punish its illegal acts."); 
Neil Kinkopf, The State Secrets Problem: Can Congress Fix It?, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 489, 492 
(2007) (noting that the government may avoid public accountability when litigants are 
unable to maintain their lawsuits); Lyons, supra note 3, at 126 (arguing that misuse of the 
privilege interferes with the "public rights" that allow people to serve "as a watchdog on 
the government").  
6. See Brief of Professors of Constitutional Law, Federal Jurisdiction, and Foreign 
Relations Law as Amici Curiae in Support of Mohamed and Urging Reversal at 1 ,  
Mohamed v .  Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 586 F.3d 1 108 (9th Cir. 2008) (No. 08-15693), 2008 
WL 6042363 (arguing that broad construction of the privilege "risks infringing upon . . .  
the proper separation of powers"); Frost, supra note 3, at 1950-58 (attempting to dismiss 
entire lawsuits interferes with the constitutional structure of government and the courts' 
role as a check on executive power); Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 2, at 88-90 (excessive 
secrecy and misuse of privilege poses a threat to democracy); Huq, supra note 2 (arguing 
that courts should play a role in important debates over assertions of government 
power). 
7. See 154 CONG. REC. S198-02 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 2008) (statement of Sen. 
Kennedy) (" [T]he Bush administration has raised the privilege in over 25 percent more 
cases per year than previous administrations and has sought dismissal in over 90 percent 
more cases."); see also FISHER, supra note 2, at 245; Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 2, at 
101-02. 
8. See, e.g., El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 310 (4th Cir. 2007) (dismissing 
plaintiff's constitutional and statutory claims based on his alleged torture and rendition 
because "virtually any conceivable response to El-Masri's allegations would disclose 
privileged information"); Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1 128, 
1 136 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (dismissing plaintiffs' statutory claims because the core of their 
case involved '"allegations' of covert U.S. military or CIA operations in foreign countries 
against foreign nationals-clearly a subject matter which is a state secret"), rev'd 563 F.3d 
992 (9th Cir. 2009), amended by 579 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2009), reh'g en bane granted, 586 
F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2009). 
As this article was going to press, the Ninth Circuit issued an en bane decision 
affirming the district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint. See Mohamed v. 
Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., _ F.3d _, 2010 WL 3489913 (9th Cir. Sept. 8, 2010). Later 
citations will not reflect the en bane decision. 
9. Professor Chesney, after surveying published cases since Reynolds, questions 
whether Bush Administration officials asserted the privilege significantly more than 
officials in previous decades. Robert Chesney, State Secrets and the Limits of National 
Security Litigation, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1249, 1299-1308 (2008) (finding a somewhat 
steady, although non-linear increase in assertions in decades from 1950 through the early 
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Administration's tendency to assert the privilege in high profile 
lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of terrorism-related 
programs, such as the renditions of individuals to other 
countries10 or the warrantless surveillance of citizens' telephone 
calls,11 added to its growing public image as excessively 
secretive.12 
Detractors of the Bush Administration thus looked 
expectantly to the Obama Administration for change. In the 
beginning, there was reason for hope. During the presidential 
campaign, Obama criticized the Bush Administration for 
"ignor[ing] public disclosure rules" and invoking the state secrets 
privilege "more than any other previous administration to get 
cases thrown out of civil court."1 3  Nevertheless, in early 2009, the 
Obama Administration disappointed critics of the state secrets 
privilege by defending or extending the Bush Administration's 
assertions of the privilege.14 Although the Obama 
2000s); see also FISHER, supra note 2, at 212 (noting that increased assertion of the 
privilege, " [a] trend well in place before the terrorist attacks of September 1 1 ,  2001, has 
been on an upward climb"). Other scholars, however, argue that the Bush 
Administration's use of the privilege outpaced the earlier increases. See Laura Donohue, 
The Shadow of State Secrets, 159 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010); Frost, supra note 3, 
at 1939; PATRICE MCDERMOTT & AMY FULLER, 0PENTHEGOVERMENT.ORG, 
SECRECY REPORT CARD 2008, at 20 (2008), http://www.openthegovernment.org/ 
otg/SecrecyReportCard08.pdf. They also argue that the Bush Administration has used 
the privilege qualitatively differently than earlier administrations, invoking it to dismiss 
lawsuits. Frost, supra note 3, at 1939; Telman, supra note 3, at 522; see also infra Part LC. 
10. See supra note 8; see also Note, Compensating Victims of Wrongful Detention, 
Torture, and Abuse in the U.S. War on Terror, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1 158, 1 163 (2009) ("So 
far, the government has invoked the state secrets privilege primarily in rendition cases, 
and the courts have been manifestly deferential."). 
11 .  See, e.g., AI-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v.  Bush, 451 F.  Supp. 2d 1215, 1218 
(D. Or. 2006), rev'd, 507 F.3d 1 190 (9th Cir. 2007); ACLU v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 438 F. 
Supp. 2d 754, 758-60 (E.D. Mich. 2006), vacated, 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007); Hepting v. 
AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 978-80 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 
12. For discussion of secrecy during the Bush Administration, see Meredith Fuchs, 
Judging Secrets: The Role Courts Should Play in Preventing Unnecessary Secrecy, 58 
ADMIN. L. REV. 131, 132-37 (2006); Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 2, at 85-86; Christina 
E. Wells, "National Security" Information and the Freedom of Information Act, 56 
ADMIN. L. REV. 1195, 1999-1202 (2004). 
13. See Glenn Greenwald, The 180-Degree Reversal of Obama's State Secrets 
Position, SALON.COM, Feb. 10, 2009, http://www.salon.com/opinion/greenwald/ 
2009/02/10/obama/ (quoting the Obama/Biden campaign website). 
14. See John Schwartz, Obama Backs off a Reversal on Secrets, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/10/us/10torture.htrnl (discussing the oral argument in 
Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc.); Electronic Frontier Foundation, Obama 
Administration Embraces Bush Position on Warrantless Wiretapping and Secrecy, Apr. 6, 
2009, http://www.eff.org/press/archives/2009/04/05 (discussing the Obama administration's 
assertion of the privilege in Jewel v. Nat'l Sec. Agency); Press Release, U.S. Dep't of 
Justice, Statement of Attorney General Eric Holder on Assertion of the State Secrets 
Privilege in Shubert v. Obama (Oct. 30, 2009), available at http://www. 
justice.gov/ag/testimony/2009/ag-testimony-091030.htrnl; Government Defendants' Notice 
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Administration argued it had carefully reviewed earlier 
assertions of the privilege, invoking it "only when necessary and 
in the most appropriate cases,"15 critics were unappeased. Soon 
thereafter, President Obama promised to reform executive use 
of the privilege,16 and in September 2009 the Justice Department 
announced a new policy regarding the state secrets privilege.1 7  
That policy established evidentiary and harm requirements prior 
to assertion of the privilege, a principle of allowing cases to 
move forward after assertion of the privilege except in 
exceptional circumstances, and multiple layers of internal review 
for each assertion.1 8 Attorney General Holder stated that the 
policy was designed to "provide greater accountability and 
reliability in the invocation of the state secrets privilege" and to 
"strengthen public confidence [in the] U.S. government."19 
The Obama policy is surely a response to the privilege's 
critics, whose arguments raise the specter of unaccountable 
officials run amok. The Administration's vision of 
accountability, however, departs from traditional notions of 
political accountability that dominate legal discourse.20 Political 
accountability has generally meant "vesting of ultimate 
decisional authority in a person who is elected."21 Accordingly, 
of Motion & Motion to Dismiss & for Summary Judgment at 12-21, Jewel v. Nat'l Sec. 
Admin., No. C:08-cv-4373-VRW (N.D. Cal. June 25, 2009), available at 
http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/jewel/jewelmtdobama.pdf (asserting the privilege in 
response to a lawsuit pertaining to National Security Agency wiretapping); Government 
Defendants' Notice of Renewed Motion to Dismiss & For Summary Judgment & 
Memorandum in Support at 4-9, Shubert v. Obama, No. M:06-cv-01791-VRW (Dec. 15, 
2009), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/jud/statesec/shubertl03009.pdf (asserting the 
privilege in another National Security Agency wiretapping case); Petition for Rehearing 
or Rehearing En Banc, Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 563 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 
2009) (No. 08-15693) (asserting the privilege in a rendition lawsuit); available at 
http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ datastore/uploads/ enbanc/08-15693 pfr. pdf. 
15. See Schwartz, supra note 14. 
16. See Kevin Poulsen, Obama: State Secrets Privilege is "Overbroad," WIRED, Apr. 
30, 2009, http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/04/obama-state-secrets-privilege-is­
overbroad/. 
17. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Attorney General Establishes New State 
Secrets Policies and Procedures, (Sept. 23, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/opa/ 
pr/2009/September/09-ag-1013.html. 
18. See Memorandum from Attorney Gen. Eric Holder to Heads of Executive 
Dep'ts and Agencies and Heads of Dep't Components 1 (Sept. 23, 2009) , available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/state-secret-privileges.pdf [hereinafter Holder 
Memorandum]; see also infra Part II.A. 
19. Holder Memorandum, supra note 18, at 1. 
20. Glen Staszewski, Reason-Giving and Accountability, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1253, 
1256-64 (2009). 
21. Peter M. Shane, Political Accountability in a System of Checks and Balances: 
The Case of Presidential Review of Rulemaking, 48 ARK. L. REV. 161, 196 (1994); see also 
Rebecca Brown, Accountability, Liberty and the Constitution, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 
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an official is accountable because she can be voted out of office 
(or is answerable to an elected official, such as the President). 
Accountability, however, has many different meanings and the 
Obama policy embraces a concept quite different from political 
accountability. Specifically, it adopts what this essay terms 
"explanatory accountability." That is, by forcing more 
thoughtful, evaluative invocation of the privilege, the Obama 
policy requires executive officials to explain and justify their 
privilege assertions.22 
Unlike political accountability, which simply assumes 
officials are accountable because they are "selected and 
potentially removed from office by the voters,"23 explanatory 
accountability involves the expectation that officials might 
actually be asked to justify their particular policy decisions to 
others or face negative consequences.24 Explanatory 
accountability thus involves accountability on a day-to-day basis 
and in the context of specific relationships and decisions. 
Although scholars have focused less on this aspect of 
accountability, it is nonetheless important in checking official 
action,25 as the Obama Administration recognizes by attempting 
to establish an explanatory accountability mechanism regarding 
the state secrets doctrine. 
To the extent that the Obama policy requires officials to 
justify assertions of the privilege, it shows promise. Psychological 
research on accountability reveals that individuals who believe 
they will be held accountable generally reach better-reasoned 
533 (1998); Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-Administrative 
Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2073 (2005); Staszewski, supra note 20, at 1256. 
22. Professor Staszewski has coined the term "deliberative accountability" to 
distinguish between political accountability and his notion of accountability as requiring 
"reason giving." Our notions of explanatory and deliberative accountability overlap 
significantly. However, since we come at them from different starting points and via 
different lenses, I use a different term to emphasize their somewhat different outlooks. 
23. Staszewski, supra note 20, at 1254. 
24. Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects of 
Accountability, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 255 ,  255 (1999); see also Rubin, supra note 21, at 
2119 ("As used in ordinary language, accountability refers to the ability of one actor to 
demand an explanation or justification of another actor for its actions and to reward or 
punish that second actor on the basis of its performance or its explanation."). 
25. See, e.g., Rubin, supra note 21,  at 2120 (discussing the role this notion of 
accountability plays in an administrative state); Staszewski, supra note 20, at 1254 
("[V]oters must be able to hold public officials accountable for their specific policy 
choices to ensure that those decisions are consistent with the preferences of a majority.") 
(emphasis in original). For a discussion of different explanatory accountability 
mechanisms regarding government action, see Kathleen Clark, The Architecture of 
Accountability: A Case Study of the Warrantless Surveillance Program, 2010 BYU L. REV. 
(forthcoming). 
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decisions.26 Administrative officials willing to ask hard questions 
of each other may, in fact, more thoughtfully assert the state 
secrets privilege. The question remains, however, whether the 
new policy will actually force those hard questions and serve as a 
mechanism of explanatory accountability. Unfortunately, the 
policy's standards are unlikely to force such hard questions, as 
they leave too much to official discretion. Thus, the policy likely 
will not achieve real accountability within the Administration. 
Furthermore, the new policy provides no mechanism of 
explanatory accountability beyond the executive branch. It never 
proposes to do in an actual courtroom any of the things arguably 
required of officials within the executive branch-i.e., prove a 
significant harm to national security, share evidence of such 
harm, or engage in detailed description of the harm. Courts 
cannot discern whether a privilege assertion is justified if 
executive officials are not required to justify it in detail. 
Furthermore, under existing court standards, it is unlikely that 
courts can, or will, routinely force explanatory accountability. 
Court treatment of the privilege has been notoriously squishy 
and deferential and judges are inconsistent, at best, in reviewing 
privilege assertions. The Obama policy is unlikely to improve 
executive assertions of the privilege absent a change in the 
courts' approach to the privilege. In fact, the Obama 
Administration's recent privilege assertions suggest as much. 
Section I of this Essay reviews the state secrets privilege, 
focusing first on the Supreme Court's recognition of it in United 
States v. Reynolds,21 and then on its subsequent application in the 
lower courts. Section I specifically discusses some of the 
common problems associated with Reynolds' formulation of the 
privilege. Section II discusses explanatory accountability and the 
extent to which the Obama policy is both promising and falls 
short as a mechanism of such accountability. Section III then 
explains why the Obama policy cannot serve as an adequate 
accountability mechanism. Nothing in the policy compels 
Administration cooperation with courts once the state secrets 
privilege is asserted. Moreover, the current iteration of the state 
26. Lerner & Tetlock, supra note 24, at 263; see also discussion infra Part II.B. 
27. 345 U.S. 1 (1953). Reynolds is the first case to explicitly recognize the privilege, 
but courts often locate its roots as far back as the trial of Aaron Burr in 1807. See, e.g., In 
re United States, 872 F.2d 47 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ; Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 
974, 980 (N.D. Cal. 2006). See generally FISHER, supra note 2, at 212-24; Holly Wells, 
Note, The State Secrets Privilege: Overuse Causing Unintended Consequences, 50 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 967, 972-73 (2008). 
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secrets doctrine does not give courts adequate tools to deem 
judicial review a consistent mechanism of accountability. This 
Section concludes, however, with a discussion of proposed 
congressional legislation that may improve judicial review as a 
mechanism of accountability in cases involving the state secrets 
privilege. 
I. THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE 
A. UNITED STATES V. REYNOLDS 
Reynolds involved a negligence lawsuit against the 
government after the deaths of three civilians in an Air Force 
plane crash. Their families sought discovery of the official 
accident report and statements of surviving crew members, 
material over which the government asserted a privilege against 
disclosure because the plane was testing secret equipment at the 
time.2 8 After refusing to produce the material despite the lower 
court's order, the government eventually appealed to the 
Supreme Court.29 The Supreme Court recognized that the 
"privilege against revealing military secrets . . . [was] well­
established in the law of evidence," but acknowledged that 
"judicial experience" with the privilege had been limited.30 
Nevertheless, available precedents suggested clear principles 
that "control[led] the application of the privilege." 31 First, the 
privilege belongs to the government and cannot be asserted by a 
private party.32 Second, a department head must assert the 
28. 345 U.S. at 4-5. 
29. After losing a motion to quash discovery of the material, the government 
refused to comply with the district court's order of production. The Air Force sent a 
letter to the court stating that it would "not be in the public interest" to furnish the 
requested evidence. After opportunity for rehearing, in which the Air Force continued its 
refusal to furnish the report, but offered the three surviving crew members for 
examination, the district court again ordered production of the material. The Air Force 
refused and the court issued an order finding that "the facts on the issue of negligence 
would be taken as established in plaintiffs' favor." Id. The district court eventually 
entered judgment in the plaintiffs' favor. The court of appeals affirmed the district court. 
Id. at 5. 
30. Id. at 6-7. Lower courts note that the privilege "extends to diplomatic and 
intelligence-gathering matters as well as military secrets." Maxwell v. First Nat'l Bank of 
Md., 143 F.R.D. 590, 594 n.3 (D. Md. 1992); see also Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51 ,  57 
(D.C. Cir. 1983); Halkin v. Helms, 690 F.2d 977, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
31. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7. 
32. Id. at 7-8. Accordingly, the privilege can be asserted not only in cases where the 
government is a party, but also in civil cases between private parties where the 
government intervenes to assert the privilege. See, e.g., Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, 
Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1 128 (N.D. Cal. 2008), rev'd, 563 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2009), amended 
by 579 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2009), reh'g en bane granted, 586 F.3d 1 108 (9th Cir. 2009); 
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privilege, and then only after personal consideration of the 
matter to be disclosed.33 
Other than these clear principles, however, the Court 
described the remainder of the privilege as a "formula of 
compromise. " 34 On the one hand, the privilege is "not to be 
lightly invoked. " 35 The Court further rejected the argument that 
judges were powerless to interfere with executive privilege 
assertions.36 "[J]udicial control over the evidence," the Court 
noted, "cannot be abdicated to the caprice of executive 
officers." 37 Rather, judges are the final arbiters as to "whether 
the circumstances are appropriate for the claim of privilege. " 38 
On the other hand, courts should review privilege assertions 
"without forcing a disclosure of the very thing the privilege is 
designed to protect." 39 Accordingly, lower courts should not 
automatically require in camera review of arguably privileged 
information. Rather, if "all the circumstances of the case" 
convince a judge that compelled disclosure of evidence poses a 
"reasonable danger . . .  to national security . . .  the court should 
not jeopardize the security which the privilege is meant to 
protect by insisting upon an examination of the evidence, even 
by the judge alone, in chambers. "40 
In addition, the Court found that a judge's scrutiny of the 
privilege varies depending upon the litigant's need for the 
information: 
In each case, the showing of necessity ... will determine how 
far the court should probe in satisfying itself that the occasion 
for invoking the privilege is appropriate. Where there is a 
DTM Research, L.L.C. v. AT&T Corp., 245 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 2001). 
33. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7-8. 
34. Id. at 9. 
35. Id. at 7. The Court designed its requirements to limit the assertion of the 
privilege to department heads based on personal consideration. See, e.g. , Nat'l Lawyers 
Guild v. Attorney Gen., 96 F.R.D. 390, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (noting that the purpose of 
the requirements is "to insure that the privilege is claimed by someone in the executive 
branch with sufficient authority and responsibility so that the court can rely upon his 
judgment that the claim was prudently invoked"). 
36. 345 U.S. at 6. The government argued that forced disclosure would cause 
"unwarranted interference with the powers of the executive . . .  to choose whether to 
disclose public documents contrary to the public interest." Brief for the United States at 
8-9, Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953) (No. 21). 
37. 345 U.S. at 9-10. The Court analogized to the privilege against self­
incrimination when it noted that "complete abandonment of judicial control would lead 
to intolerable abuses." Id. at 8. 
38. Id. at 8. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at 10. 
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strong showing of necessity, the claim of privilege should not 
be lightly accepted, but even the most compelling necessity 
cannot overcome the claim of privilege if the. court is 
ultimately satisfied that military secrets are at stake.41 
633 
Applying this scrutiny, the Reynold's Court, without reviewing 
the accident report, found assertion of the privilege appropriate 
in light of the danger that the report "would contain references 
to the secret electronic equipment,"42 and because of plaintiffs' 
minimal need for the information.43 
B. APPLICATION IN THE LOWER COURTS 
Lower courts vary in their approaches to Reynolds' 
"formula of compromise." Some take seriously Reynolds' 
command that the privilege is "not to be lightly invoked" and 
engage in searching scrutiny of the privilege assertion. Others, 
however, are quite deferential to assertions of the privilege, 
requiring only minimal showings. The latter practice has been 
especially criticized. 
Courts engaging in searching scrutiny view Reynolds as 
requiring the government to disentangle sensitive and non­
sensitive information so that the latter can be released.44 In 
addition, such courts are more likely to use in camera review of 
evidence to determine whether the government's assertion is 
appropriate.45 Some courts go as far as ruling that in camera 
review is obligatory in certain instances.46 Courts engaging in 
41. Id. at 1 1. Courts emphasize that the litigant's need for the information applies 
only to the level of scrutiny applied to the privilege assertion-necessity for the 
information is not an issue once the court determines that the privilege applies. See, e.g. ,  
Halkin v .  Helms, 690 F.2d 977, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ("Although the courts i n  evaluating 
claims of the privilege may take cognizance of the need for the information 
demonstrated by the party seeking disclosure, such need is a factor only in determining 
the extent of the court's inquiry into the appropriateness of the claim."). 
42. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10. 
43. Id. at 11. The Court found that there was no evidence suggesting a link between 
the electronic equipment and the accident, and also that the government had offered 
access to the surviving crew members. Id. 
44. Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 983 (N.D. Cal. 2006); Linder v. 
Calero-Portocarrero, 183 F.R.D. 314, 325 (D.D.C. 1998); Jabara v. Kelly, 75 F.R.D. 475, 
492 (E.D. Mich. 1972). 
45. Hepting v. AT&T Corp., No. C-06-672, 2006 WL 1581965, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 
6, 2006) (ordering in camera review to determine whether the state secret privilege 
applies); Jabara, 75 F.R.D. at 491-92 (discussing in camera review of evidence). Professor 
Chesney's review of all reported state secrets cases is especially helpful in determining 
the existence and scope of in camera review. See Chesney, supra note 9, at Appendix. 
46. Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51 ,  59 n.37 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("[W]hen a litigant 
must lose if the claim is upheld and the Government's assertions are dubious in view of 
the nature of the information requested and the circumstances surrounding the case, 
634 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 26:625 
active review also tend to view the privilege as evidentiary in 
nature and applicable only to specific pieces of evidence, rather 
than as a way to suppress all discovery or trigger dismissal of the 
lawsuit.4 7 
Courts viewing the privilege expansively, however, treat 
privilege assertions with the "utmost deference" although the 
reasons for that deference differ.4 8 At some level, the very nature 
of the Court's "compromise" argues for deference. Reynolds 
allows courts to uphold privilege assertions after eschewing in 
camera review49 based on little more than conclusory and self­
serving government declarations.5° Furthermore, the Court's 
balancing test favors deference. Asking courts to determine 
whether evidence that it often has not reviewed poses a 
"reasonable danger" to national security requires speculation 
that weights the balance in favor of the government.51 
careful in camera examination of the material is not only appropriate . . . but 
obligatory."); Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Brown, 619 F.2d 1 170, 1 173 (7th Cir. 1980) 
(en bane) (" [A] party's showing of need often compels the district court to conduct an in 
camera review of documents allegedly covered by the privilege in order to determine 
whether the records are properly classified 'secret' by the Government."); see also 
Rahman v. Chertoff, No. 05-C-3761 ,  2008 WL 4534407 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 16, 2008). 
47. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 563 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2009) (making 
clear privilege was an evidentiary privilege), amended by 579 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2009), 
reh'g en bane granted, 586 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2009); Hepting, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 994; 
Spock v. United States, 464 F. Supp. 5 10, 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Jabara, 75 F.R.D. at 492-
93. 
48. Halkin v. Helms, 690 F.2d 977, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1982); In re United States, Misc. 
No. 374, 1993 WL 262658, at *7 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 30, 1993) (order on writ of mandamus); 
Zuckerbraun v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 935 F.2d 544, 547 (2d Cir. 1991); Northrop Corp. 
v. McDonald Douglas Corp., 751 F.2d 395, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
49. See, e.g. , Trulock v. Lee, 66 F. App'x 472, 477-78, 2003 WL 21267827 (4th Cir. 
2003); Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1 159, 1 159 (9th Cir. 1998); Zuckerbraun, 935 F.2d at 
548; Northrop Corp. , 751 F.2d at 401; see also Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 2, at 108 
(noting the courts' "demonstrated reluctance to . . .  conduct in camera inspections of 
material before affirming secrecy"). Professor Chesney's appendix reflects the number of 
times courts have sustained privilege assertions without utilizing in camera review of the 
actual disputed materials. See Chesney, supra note 9, at 1315-22. 
50. Nat'l Lawyers Guild v. Attorney Gen., 96 F.R.D. 390, 396 n.1 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) 
(citing 8 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2378a, at 793 (1940)) (noting that an affidavit is 
usually prepared by subordinates after which it "works its way up through channels, until 
it arrives upon the desk of the departmental head, who perfunctorily signs it without 
further consideration"). 
51. Christopher D. Yamaoka, The State Secrets Privilege: What's Wrong With It, 
How It Got That Way and How the Courts Can Fix It, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 139, 155 
(2007) ("[W]hile the opinion cautions courts not to give too much discretion, it requires 
courts not to insist on complete disclosure.") (emphasis added); Huq, supra note 2 ("All 
the government has to do to cloak itself in secrecy is use an ex parte proceeding to scare 
a non-specialist judge into believing that their claim of confidentiality is reasonable."). 
For a discussion of the psychological phenomena leading to such weighting, see Christina 
E. Wells, Questioning Deference, 69 Mo. L. REV. 903, 921-29 (2004). 
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Courts apply deferential scrutiny for other reasons, as well. 
Some accept the argument that the privilege, though evidentiary 
in nature, has constitutional overtones implicating executive 
prerogative.52 Others acknowledge that practical reasons prevent 
judges from "safely and reliably evaluat[ing] invocations of the 
state secrets privilege."53 Thus, some courts feel "ill-equipped to 
provide the kind of security highly sensitive information should 
have"54 even with in camera and ex parte review of the materials. 
Other courts rely on "mosaic theory," accepting the 
government's argument that judges lack sufficient expertise to 
decide secrecy issues. According to mosaic theory, intelligence 
work is "akin to the construction of a mosaic" where an item of 
information seems (or is) insignificant standing alone, but 
actually has great importance to one who pieces the innocuous 
information together.55 Courts adhering to the theory believe 
they are "ill-equipped to become sufficiently steeped in foreign 
intelligence matters to serve effectively in the review of secrecy 
classifications in that area. "56 As a result, they defer to the 
government's arguments favoring broad secrecy. 
As critics of the state secrets privilege have noted, 
deferential review can have a significant impact on disclosure of 
government-held information. The government's tendency to 
exaggerate national security harms posed by the release of 
information is well-documented.57 Accordingly, judicial 
52. Halkin, 598 F.2d at 9; Zuckerbraun, 935 F.2d at 547; El-Masri v. United States, 
479 F.3d 296, 303 (4th Cir. 2007). Reynolds did not ground the privilege in the 
Constitution. Rather it referred to English precedents as the source of the privilege. 
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 ,  5 (1953). However, the Court alluded to the 
"constitutional overtones" involved in the government's argument. Id. at 6 & n.9. Some 
lower courts have relied on that allusion and a later statement in United States v. Nixon, 
418 U.S. 683 (1974), that in areas of military or diplomatic secrets "the courts have 
traditionally shown the utmost deference to Presidential responsibilities,'' id. at 710. 
There is also a rich scholarly discussion about the source of the privilege. See, e.g. , 
Chesney, supra note 9, at 1271-98; Telman, supra note 3, at 502-03; Brief of Professors of 
Constitutional Law, supra note 6, at 3-5. 
53. Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51 ,  57 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
54. Id. at 58 (quoting Clift v. United States, 597 F.2d 826, 829 (2d Cir. 1979)). 
55. Halkin, 598 F.2d at 8-9 (quoting United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1318 
(4th Cir. 1972) ). 
56. Id. ; El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 305; Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1 166 (9th Cir. 
1998); Edmonds v. Dep't of Justice, 405 F. Supp. 2d 23, 32 (D.D.C. 2005). For in-depth 
discussion of mosaic theory, see Christina Wells, CIA v. Sims: Mosaic Theory and 
Government Attitude, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 845 (2006) , and David E. Pozen, Note, The 
Mosaic Theory, National Security and the Freedom of Information Act, 115  YALE L.J. 628 
(2005). 
57. Wells, supra note 12, at 1 198-1205 (discussing the historical relationship 
between national security and presidential secrecy); Christina E. Wells, Information 
Control in Times of Crisis: The Tools of Repression, 30 OHIO N.U. REV. 451 ,  452-61 
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acceptance of government affidavits without more will likely 
result in inadequate segregation of sensitive and non-sensitive 
information. It further allows government officials to hide 
evidence of wrongdoing or embarrassing information. Critics 
often point to the Reynolds case as evidence of both phenomena. 
Recently declassified documents reveal that the government's 
assertion of the privilege did not protect sensitive information; 
rather, it merely hid the government's negligence with respect to 
the plane accident.58 
Judicial deference to mosaic theory compounds the problem 
by allowing suppression of non-sensitive information on 
extremely tenuous grounds. Mosaic theory expressly shields 
from production otherwise innocuous information that might, if 
combined by knowledgeable actors with other information, pose 
a danger to national security. It is thus more nebulous than 
Reynolds' potentially-deferential standard and favors greater 
suppression.59 Mosaic theory broadens the state secrets privilege, 
changing it from a tool for protecting "the most sensitive 
information" from disclosure into a tool that allows suppression 
of "unclassified information that cannot in any sense be 
reasonably characterized as a state secret. "60 
(2004) (discussing historical efforts to keep national security related information secret). 
58. Erin M. Stilp, Comment, The Military and State Secrets Privilege: The Quietly 
Expanding Power, 55 CATI-I. U. L. REV. 831 ,  844-47 (2006) (noting that a report was 
wrongly treated as sensitive); Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 2, at 99 (" [I]t is now known 
that the goal of the government in claiming the privilege in Reynolds was to avoid 
liability and embarrassment.");  Jack Weinstein, The Role of Judges in a Government of, 
by, and for the People: Notes for the Fifty-Eighth Cardozo Lecture, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1, 92 (2008) (noting that the "very case recognizing the 'state secrets' privilege was based 
on an executive impulse to conceal its own mistakes"). 
Other examples abound. Soon after World War II, ·the government secretly and 
forcibly repatriated anti-communist Russians, refusing to declassify its files on the subject 
even twenty years later. See Epstein v. Resor, 421 F.2d 930 (9th Cir. 1970) (providing a 
description of Operation Keelhaul). Similarly, the CIA went to great lengths to keep the 
public from knowing about MKULTRA, a human subject psychological research project, 
many of whose subjects were unaware they were participants. See Wells, supra note 56, 
at 848-49. 
59. Wells, supra note 56, at 855 ("[T]he presence of so many variables in mosaic 
theory-a hostile intelligence agency that might be lurking about (or not), a bigger 
picture that could be constructed (or not), with this innocuous (or not) piece of the 
puzzle-leads to extreme judicial deference.") ;  Pozen, supra note 56, at 641 (noting that 
the mosaic theory presents judges with reasons to "fear disclosure and mistrust their own 
judgment"). 
60. Weaver & Pallitto, supra note 2, at 104. 
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C. STATE SECRETS AND LAWSUIT DISMISSALS 
Critics of the state secrets privilege have recently pointed to 
a different concern arising from Reynolds' malleable test-i.e., 
government attempts to dismiss lawsuits prior to the discovery 
process. The possibility of dismissal after successful invocation of 
the state secrets privilege has always existed. Typically, however, 
dismissal occurred because the excluded evidence was critical to 
proving plaintiffs' prima facie case, or the defendants could not 
mount an adequate defense absent the evidence.61 Within the last 
fifteen years, however, even where plaintiffs could proceed with 
lawsuits using non-sensitive information, government officials 
have asserted the privilege (and courts have dismissed) based on 
the theory that "the very subject matter" of the litigation is a 
state secret.62 Critics decry this trend, arguing that it effectively 
transforms the state secrets privile3e from an evidentiary rule 
into a "de facto grant of immunity." 
The trend has largely resulted from an unwarranted 
expansion of Totten v. United States,64 a case related to Reynolds. 
The Totten doctrine originated as a bar to litigation in situations 
involving clandestine espionage relationships. Thus, the 
Supreme Court found that a party to a secret espionage contract 
could not enforce it against the government because "public 
policy forbids the maintenance of any suit . . .  the trial of which 
would inevitably lead to the disclosure of matters which the law 
61. As the court in Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1 166 (9th Cir. 1998) , 
summarized: " [B]y invoking the privilege over particular evidence, the evidence is 
completely removed from the case. The plaintiff's case then goes forward based on 
evidence not covered by the privilege. If, after further proceedings, the plaintiff cannot 
prove the prima .facie elements of her claim with nonprivileged evidence, then the court 
may dismiss her claim as it would with any plaintiff who cannot prove her case. 
Alternatively, 'if the privilege deprives the defendant of information that would 
otherwise give the defendant a valid defense to the claim, then the court may grant 
summary judgment to the defendant."' Id. at 1166 (emphasis in original) (quoting 
Bareford v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 973 F.2d 1138, 1141 (5th Cir.1992) (citations 
omitted)). Accord Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 
(E.D. Mich. 2006); Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 984 (N.D. Cal. 2006). 
62. Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1 166 (" [I)f the 'very subject matter of the action is a state 
secret, then the court should dismiss the plaintiff's action based solely on the invocation 
of the state secrets privilege."' (quoting United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 n.26 
(1953))). For cases dismissed upon a subject matter theory, see El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. 
Supp. 2d 530 (E.D. Va. 2006); Edmonds v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 323 F. Supp. 2d 65 
(D.D.C. 2004); Trulock v. Lee, 66 F. App'x 472, 473 (4th Cir. 2003); Bareford v. Gen. 
Dynamics Corp., 973 F.2d 1138, 1 144 (5th Cir. 1992); Bowles v. U.S., 950 F.2d 154, 155 
(4th Cir. 1991) ;  Guong v. U.S., 860 F.2d 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1988). For a discussion of the 
increase in pre-discovery dismissals, see Frost, supra note 3 ,  at 1939-40; Stilp, supra note 
58, at 837-41; Wells, supra note 27, at 975. 
63. Owen Piss, The Example of America, 119 YALE L.J. 1, 15 (2009). 
64. 92 U.S. 105 (1875).  
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itself regards as confidential. "65 The Court further observed no 
unfairness in such a result because both parties to the contract 
"must have understood that the lips of the other were to be 
forever sealed respecting the relation of either to the matter."66 
As the Supreme Court later reiterated, Totten acts as a bar to 
justiciability where secret espionage contracts are at the heart of 
the case.6 7  Such a doctrine should be read narrowly and contrasts 
with the state secrets doctrine, which requires a balancing to 
determine whether specific evidence should be disclosed. 
Nevertheless, government officials increasingly rely on a 
footnote in Reynolds to weave Totten-like justiciability 
arguments into state secrets privilege assertions. Reynolds did 
refer to Totten to illustrate a situation where even compelling 
necessity could not overcome a privilege claim: "[T]he very 
subject matter of the action, a contract to perform espionage, 
was a matter of state secret. The action was dismissed on the 
pleadings without ever reaching the question of evidence, since it 
was so obvious that the action should never prevail over the 
privilege."6 8 Government officials point to this language when 
urging dismissal of lawsuits at the pleadings stage based on the 
state secrets privilege.6 9 The Bush Administration was especially 
aggressive in using such language to argue for pre-discovery 
dismissals in the overwhelming majority of post-September 11th 
lawsuits. 70 
65. Id. at 107. 
66. Id. at 106; see also Yamaoka, supra note 51 ,  at 148. 
67. See Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1 ,  8-11 (2005). 
68. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 n.26 (1953). 
69. They sometimes also rely on broad language at the end of Totten to extend the 
doctrine beyond its initial boundaries. For discussion, see Sean C. Flynn, The Totten 
Doctrine and Its Poisoned Progeny, 25 VT. L. REV. 793, 794 (2001); Yamaoka, supra note 
51 ,  at 145. 
70. Government officials made these assertions in lawsuits involving rendition. See, 
e.g. , Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1 128, 1136 (N.D. Cal. 2008), 
rev'd 563 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2009), amended by 579 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2009), reh'g en bane 
granted, 586 F.3d 1 108 (9th Cir. 2009); El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 535-41 
(E.D. Va. 2006). For lawsuits involving government eavesdropping, see Terkel v. AT&T 
Corp., 441 F. Supp. 2d 899, 908-20 (N.D. Ill. 2006); Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 
2d 974, 980-99 (N.D. Cal. 2006); Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 451 F. Supp. 
2d 1215, 1220-33 (D. Or. 2006), rev'd, 507 F.3d 1 190 (9th Cir. 2007); Defendants' Motion 
to Dismiss, Or in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment at § 4, Am. Civil Liberties 
Union v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (No. 2:06-CV-10204), 
vacated, 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007). For lawsuits alleging government constitutional and 
statutory violations, see Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Edmonds v. U.S. Dep't of 
Justice, 323 F. Supp. 2d 65 (D.D.C. 2004) (No. 1 :02CV01448) , 2002 WL 32969563. 
In some cases it is difficult to tell whether government officials differentiate between 
Totten, subject matter, and prima facie theories of dismissal, as they are often discussed 
together as reasons supporting dismissal at the pleading stage. See, e.g. , Brief for 
2010] STATE SECRETS & ACCOUNTABILITY 639 
Reynolds and Totten, however, involve distinct situations 
that argue against eliding the boundaries of the two doctrines. 71 
Totten's distinct bar arises from its specific facts-litigation over 
a clandestine relationship that both parties agreed to keep 
secret. In such instances "the very subject matter of the case" 
cannot remain secret if litigation is to occur, a fact the plaintiff 
knows when entering the contract. Allowing subject matter 
dismissals beyond these types of clandestine relationships, 
however, is problematic. First, it is difficult to restrict the 
breadth of such assertions -especially when supported by vague 
allegations of harm, attempts to avoid in camera review of 
documents, and arguments grounded in mosaic theory. The 
vagueness of the government's argument effectively casts the 
subject matter of any lawsuit as a state secret merely because the 
government wants to keep it secret. Second, many lawsuits in 
which the state secrets privilege arises involve allegations of 
constitutional or statutory violations rather than contractual 
disputes. From a due process perspective, a plaintiff facing 
dismissal is not in the same position as a party to a secret 
espionage contract who understood the nature of her 
relationship with the government. Not surprisingly, critics raise 
serious concerns that expansion of the privilege leaves 
government officials unaccountable for potentially illegal and 
unconstitutional actions.72 
Appellee United States of America, Schwartz v. Raytheon, 150 F. App'x 627 (9th Cir. 
2005) (No. 03-55571) ,  2004 WL 3079536. Courts fall into a similar trap. See Jeppesen, 539 
F. Supp. 2d at 1 133-36; El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 306. This is not surprising given how 
difficult it is to differentiate between the prima facie and subject matter theories. For 
example, in Arar v. Ashcroft government officials sought dismissal of the case based on 
the prima facie theory. 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 252 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), aff'd, 532 F.3d 157 (2d 
Cir. 2008), vacated, 585 F.3d 559 (2nd Cir. 2009). Yet they repeatedly mentioned that 
state secrets were "at the core" of plaintiff's case. Memorandum in Support of the United 
States' Assertion of State Secrets Privilege, Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250 
(E.D.N.Y. 2006) (No. 104CV00249), 2005 WL 6140578. Such language suggests that the 
government easily could have pursued a subject matter theory of dismissal. Accordingly, 
many of the arguments made against the subject matter theory could also apply to the 
prima facie theory if it is used broadly to seek dismissal at the pre-discovery stage. 
For cases in which the Bush Administration did not seek dismissal at the pre­
discovery stage, see Rahman v. Chertoff, No. 05-C-3761 ,  2008 WL 4534407 (N.D. 
Ill. Apr. 16, 2008); Burnett v. Al Baraka Inv. & Dev. Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d 82 (D.D.C 
2004). 
71. Lyons, supra note 3, at 122-23; Wells, supra note 27, at 976-77; Yamaoka, supra 
note 51 ,  at 144-49. 
72. Robyn Blumner, Injustice Hides Behind the Badge of Security, ST. PETERSBURG 
TIMES (Fla.), Feb. 10, 2008, at SP ("This closing of the courthouse door to civil litigants is 
absurd and dangerous. It reduces the Constitution to the status of a suggestion box, to be 
followed at the pleasure of the president.");  Piss, supra note 63, at 16 (noting that the 
expansion of the privilege threatens "the rule-long the hallmark of our legal system-
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II. ACCOUNTABILITY AND EXECUTIVE ASSERTIONS 
OF THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE 
Presumably in response to these accountability concerns, 
the Obama Administration announced its new policy regarding 
the state secrets privilege in September 2009. Critics' response to 
the Administration's new policy, however, has been tepid at 
best.73 This Section discusses whether that response is warranted 
or whether the policy actually provides the "greater 
accountability and reliability in the invocation of the state 
secrets privilege" that the administration claims. 74 As discussed 
below, although the policy shows promise, its vagueness prevents 
it from being anything other than a symbolic gesture. 
A. THE OBAMA POLICY 
The Attorney General's memorandum establishes policies 
and procedures for all executive agencies wanting to invoke the 
state secrets privilege in litigation. Under the new policy, the 
Department of Justice ("DOJ") will defend an assertion of the 
privilege only if the government agency "makes a sufficient 
showing that assertion of the privilege is necessary to protect 
information the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably 
could be expected to cause significant harm to the national 
defense or foreign relations (national security) of the United 
States."75 Agencies must establish that assertion of the privilege 
is necessary by submission of an affidavit to DOJ officials based 
on personal knowledge. That affidavit must "specif[y] in detail" 
the nature of the information to be protected from disclosure, 
the significant harm that disclosure is reasonably expected to 
cause, why disclosure will cause such harm, and any other 
relevant information regarding whether the privilege should be 
that subjects all government officials, even the CIA, to the Constitution, and entrusts the 
judiciary with the task of determining whether these officials have followed the 
Constitution.");  Editorial, Whose Privilege?,  N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2008, at A24 (" [W]ith 
a clear goal of avoiding accountability . . .  the Bush administration has imposed a level of 
secrecy on its operations that has no place in a democracy."). 
73. Editorial, An Incomplete State Secrets Fix, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/29/opinion/29tue1.html (noting that the policy was "a 
positive step forward, on paper, but did not go nearly far enough"); Kurt Opsahl, 
Obama's Disappointing State Secrets Procedures, EFF.COM, Sept. 24, 2009, http:// 
www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/09/obamas-disappointing-state-secrets-procedures (n0ting that 
"the new policy falls far short of the real reform that's needed"). 
74. Holder Memorandum, supra note 18, at 1. 
75. Holder Memorandum, supra note 18, at 1. This standard applies to classified 
information and nonpublic, but non-classified, information that meets the standard. 
Holder Memorandum, supra note 18, at 1. 
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invoked.7 6 Additionally, the memorandum establishes a policy of 
not seeking to dismiss a litigant's claim or lawsuit unless doing so 
"is necessary to protect against the risk of significant harm to 
national security."7 7  
The new policy further establishes a multi-level system of 
review. Accordingly, the Assistant Attorney General of the 
relevant division must recommend in writing whether to defend 
an assertion of the privilege.7 8 A recommendation to defend 
assertion of the privilege requires the Assistant Attorney 
General to determine based on personal evaluation that the 
requirements described above have been met.7 9 A State Secrets 
Review Committee, consisting of senior DOJ officials, then 
"evaluates" the Assistant Attorney General's recommendation 
and makes its own recommendation.80 Any recommendation 
against defending the privilege, however, requires the 
Committee to consult with the Director of National Intelligence 
and the agency seeking to invoke the privilege.81 Finally, the 
Deputy Attorney General reviews the Committee's 
recommendation. In turn, he or she recommends appropriate 
action to the Attorney General without whose approval an 
assertion of the privilege will not be defended.82 
B. THE OBAMA POLICY AND EXPLANATORY 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
By requiring other agency officials to justify assertion of the 
state secrets privilege to DOJ, the Obama policy involves 
explanatory accountability, which equates accountability with 
thoughtful and deliberative invocation of the privilege. This 
76. Holder Memorandum, supra note 18 ,  at 2. 
77. Holder Memorandum, supra note 18, at 1 ("The Department's policy is that the 
privilege should be invoked only to the extent necessary to protect against the risk of 
significant harm to national security. The Department will seek to dismiss a litigant's 
claim or case on the basis of the state secrets privilege only when doing so is necessary to 
protect against the risk of significant harm to national security."). 
78. Holder Memorandum, supra note 18, at 2. 
79. Holder Memorandum, supra note 18, at 2. 
80. Holder Memorandum, supra note 18, at 2-3. 
81. Holder Memorandum, supra note 18, at 3. 
82. Holder Memorandum, supra note 18, at 3. The memorandum also notes that 
the Department of Justice will investigate allegations of wrongdoing even if it defends 
privilege assertions. Thus, for each privilege assertion that precludes adjudication of 
claims, but which otherwise raises "credible allegations of government wrongdoing, the 
Department will refer those allegations to the Inspector General of the appropriate 
department or agency for further investigation." Holder Memorandum, supra note 18, at 
3.  
642 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 26:625 
concept of accountability comports both with common sense8 3 
and psychological understandings of the term. Psychologists 
typically define accountability as "the implicit or explicit 
expectation that one may be called on to justify one's beliefs, 
feelings, and actions to others. "84 Accountability also "implies 
that people who do not provide a satisfactory justification for 
their [own] actions will suffer negative consequences . . . . [and 
that] people who do provide compelling justifications will 
experience positive consequences."85 Accountability research 
shows that "when individuals know in advance that they will be 
called on to justify their decisions, especially to audiences with 
views that are unknown, individuals spend more cognitive 
resources in decision making. "86 
Aspects of the Obama policy's overall structure show 
potential for improved explanatory accountability and decision­
making.8 7 By requiring that each agency defend with particularity 
its assertion to an entity separate from the agency, the policy 
forces a possibly neutral decision-maker into the mix. As a 
result, there exists no guarantee that the agency's assertion will 
be defended (i.e., there is an audience with unknown views). 
Officials may thus spend more cognitive resources and make 
better, more self-critical decisions about privilege assertions. 
Specifically, requiring agency officials to account to the DOJ 
could alleviate a number of cognitive biases, including the 
tendency to overestimate (or manipulate) the likelihood of an 
event based upon the ease with which it can be brought to mind 
(i.e., the availability heuristic ), 8 8  the tendency to be 
83. See Wells, supra note 51 ,  at 936 n.183 (noting that accountability "is generally 
defined as liability to give account of, and answer for, discharge of duties or conduct"); 
Rubin, supra note 21. 
84. Lerner & Tetlock, supra note 24, at 263. 
85. Lerner & Tetlock, supra note 24, at 263. 
86. Gia B. Lee, The President's Secrets, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 197 (2008). This 
increased cognitive effort comes about because people want to avoid embarrassment in 
front of their audience. Lerner & Tetlock, supra note 24, at 263; ltamar Simonson & 
Peter Nye, The Effect of Accountability on Susceptibility to Decision Errors, 51  
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHA V.  & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 416 ,  441  (1992). 
87. Accountability within the executive branch is certainly not "inherently futile or 
self-serving." Steven Aftergood, A Problematic New Policy on State Secrets, SECRECY 
NEWS, Sept. 24, 2009, http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/2009/09/state_secrets-2.html 
(discussing the executive branch internal review panel for classification decisions); see 
also Beth George, An Administrative Law Approach To Reforming the State Secrets 
Privilege, 84 NYU L. REV. 1691 (2009) (discussing possible executive branch reforms to 
exert control over state secrets privilege). Such accountability mechanisms, however, 
must actually work. This Section focuses on whether proposed mechanisms actually have 
the desired effect. 
88. Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of 
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overconfident in one's judgments, particularly when uncertainty 
is involved (the overconfidence bias), 8 9  the tendency to rely only 
on confirmatory evidence, while ignoring disconfirmatory 
evidence (the confirmation trap bias), 90 and the reputational 
influences that cause Groupthink (the pressure to conform to 
group norms). 91 As I have discussed elsewhere, such biases are 
likely to be associated with national security threats and, 
similarly, assertions of the state secrets privilege. 92 
The question remains, however, whether the policy is 
sufficiently specific and independent to improve accountability 
in practice. Accountability improves decision-making because it 
motivates decision-makers to 
prepare themselves by engaging in an effortful and self­
critical search for reasons to justify their actions. This search 
leads participants to (a) survey a wider range of conceivably 
relevant cues; (b) pay greater attention to the cues they use; 
( c) anticipate counter arguments, weigh their merits relatively 
impartially, and factor those that pass some threshold of 
plausibility into their overall opinion or assessment of the 
situation; and ( d) gain greater awareness of their cognitive 
processes by regularly monitoring the cues that are allowed to 
influence judgment and choice.93 
Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 523 (2002); Diederik A. Stapel et al., The 
Impact of Accuracy Motivation on Interpretation, Comparison, and Correction Processes: 
Accuracy X Knowledge Accessibility Effects, 74 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 878, 
891 (1998); Erik P. Thompson et al., Accuracy Motivation Attenuates Covert Priming: The 
Systematic Reprocessing of Social Information, 66 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 
474, 484 (1994). 
89. Asher Koriat et al., Reasons for Confidence, J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: 
HUM. LEARNING & MEMORY 107, 116-17 (1980) (noting that requiring decision-makers 
to generate reasons opposing their course of action decreased overconfidence); Philip E. 
Tetlock & Jae 11 Kim, Accountability and Judgment Processes in Personality Prediction 
Task, 52 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 700, 706-07 (1987). 
90. Accountability may tend to increase the desire to bolster one's evidence, but 
explicit instructions to consider alternatives can correct for the problem. David M. 
Sanbonmatsu et al., Overestimating Causality: Attributional Effects of Confirmatory 
Processing, 65 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 892, 894-99 (1993). 
91. Marceline B.R. Kroon et al., Managing Group Decision Making Processes: 
Individual Versus Collective Accountability and Groupthink, 2 INT'L J. CONFLICT MGMT. 
91 ,  109-10 (1991). 
92. Wells, supra note 51 ,  at 921-35. 
93. Lerner & Tetlock, supra note 24, at 263; see also Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip E. 
Tetlock, Bridging Individual, Interpersonal, and Institutional Approaches To Judgment 
and Decision Making: The Impact of Accountability on Cognitive Bias, in EMERGING 
PERSPECTIVES ON JUDGMENT AND DECISION RESEARCH 431 ,  438 (Sandra L. Schneider 
& James Shanteau eds., 2003); Andrew Quinn & Barry R. Schlenker, Can Accountability 
Produce Independence? Goals as Determinants of the Impact of Accountability on 
Conformity, 28 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 472, 473 (2002); Philip E. 
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For decision-makers to engage in such effort, however, the 
audience must be willing to ask questions that force them to 
actually account for their decisions. Unfortunately, the Obama 
policy only superficially does this. First, the policy requires that 
the State Secrets Review Committee consult with the Director of 
National Intelligence only when it recommends against assertion 
of the privilege. 94 While one can certainly envision good reasons 
to consult with the Director of National Intelligence, a one-sided 
policy requiring consultation only when DOJ refuses to defend 
the privilege smacks of a mechanism allowing government 
officials one last attempt to convince DOJ to change its mind. 
This is not a neutral accountability mechanism. 
In addition, the policy is likely too vague to force DOJ 
attorneys to act as explanatory accountability mechanisms. Thus, 
its requirements that the privilege be asserted only in cases 
where disclosure will cause "significant harm," that such harm be 
described and proved to DOJ attorneys, and that assertions be 
narrowly-defined still leave too much discretion to DOJ 
attorneys to rubberstamp privilege assertions. 9 5  For example, the 
addition of the modifier "significant" to the requirement that 
disclosure be reasonably likely to cause harm does little to rein 
in official discretion regarding assertion of the privilege. 
Anybody can formulate an argument that harm is "significant;" 
the word is absolutely meaningless without context and a 
requirement of detailed descriptions. 
The breadth of the policy's definition of national security 
(and its application to non-classified informationt lends further 
credence to this argument as one can sweep almost anything 
within this definition with little or no explanation. As Robert 
Nagel has noted "the palpable range of choice" inherent in such 
vague formulae for decision communicate not real decision­
making, but "power without responsibility." 9 7 Similarly, although 
the policy requires justification based on personal knowledge of 
Tetlock, Accountability and Complexity of Thought, 45 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. 
PSYCHOL. 74, 81 (1983); Philip. E. Tetlock et al., Social and Cognitive Strategies for 
Coping with Accountability: Conformity, Complexity, and Bolstering, 57 J. PERSONALITY 
& Soc. PSYCHOL 632, 639-40 (1989). 
94. See Holder Memorandum, supra note 18. 
95. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie et al., The "Hidden Judiciary:" An Empirical 
Examination of Executive Branch Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1477, 1488 (2009) (discussing 
whether ALJ's decision-making improves if they think they know the views of the 
superiors to which they are ostensibly accountable). 
96. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
97. Robert F. Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REV. 165, 202-03 
(1985). 
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the type and mechanism of harm, it is not clear that affidavits­
often one sided and self-serving 9 8  -will provide the kind of detail 
necessary for true accountability. 9 9  Further, the policy does not 
obviously provide a mechanism for DOJ officials to question 
privilege assertions (although that may, in fact, be contemplated 
by the Obama Administration).100 Without a clear mandate 
regarding such questioning, too much is left to the vagaries of 
individual attorneys reviewing assertions-will they accept 
affidavits on face value, or will they ask for more if the affidavits 
are deemed unacceptable? 
Finally, although the Administration apparently desires to 
avoid broad assertions of the privilege, there is no requirement 
that agency officials explain whether narrower options are 
available with respect to their assertion of the privilege. 
Although one could assume that only the narrowest assertion of 
such a privilege meets the requirements of "necessary" to 
protect against information that could "reasonably be expected 
to cause significant danger" to national security, that 
requirement is not written down. Given the inherent vagueness 
in the standards and lack of any compulsion to consider 
alternatives, it is not clear how DOJ attorneys will approach 
broad assertions of the privilege. 
The Obama Administration could avoid some of these 
problems if its policy set out more specifically the kinds of 
particulars it sought during internal review of privilege assertions. 
For example, it could impose requirements that officials: (1) 
articulate in writing specific factors relevant to their decision; (2) 
realistically assess alternative courses of action; and (3) respond to 
meaningful questions and concerns by DOJ attorneys. It could 
further ask for the Director of National Intelligence's input along 
98. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
99. I disagree somewhat with Professor Chesney's argument that affidavits based 
on personal knowledge can serve as an accountability mechanism. See Robert Chesney, 
National Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361,  1419 (2009). To be sure, Professor 
Chesney urges that such affidavits should "require comparable declarations focused on 
the underlying decision-making process as a precondition to deference." Id. But the 
detail such explanations must contain is unclear. In addition, Professor Chesney does not 
clearly argue for external processes to counter what he acknowledges will likely be self­
serving declarations. Id. Without more detailed requirements, it is simply unclear how 
affidavits (especially if reviewed ex parte) have much effect on executive accountability. 
100. The policy requires consultation with an agency and the Director of National 
Intelligence once the DOJ decides not to defend an assertion of the privilege. See supra 
note 81 and accompanying text. But DOJ officials do not appear to have the ability to 
question officials as to the basis for their assertion prior to their decision not to defend 
the privilege. 
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the way, regardless of DOJ's likely decision. Those requirements 
would improve accountability by forcing a version of internal 
"hard look" review already familiar to many agency officials.101 
Others have shown that such review can enhance accountability 
and executive decision-making.102 Without such changes, the 
Obama policy remains largely hortatory. 
III. WHY THE OBAMA POLICY CAN NEVER BE 
ENOUGH-THE NEED FOR ACCOUNT ABILITY 
THROUGH MORE RIGOROUS JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Even assuming the Obama policy could serve as an 
accountability mechanism within the administration, it falls far 
short of providing adequate accountability to others. Absence of 
such external checks renders illusory any potential 
accountability established by the policy. Nothing in the policy, 
for example, requires that executive officials provide to courts 
any of the justifications or evidence ostensibly required during 
administrative review.10 3 Given that the privilege is actually 
raised in court proceedings, lack of such requirements is notable. 
The policy thus allows government officials to broadly assert the 
privilege based on little or no evidentiary support-a pattern the 
Obama Administration has continued in the last year. 
For example, in Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc. , a 
lawsuit challenging the legality of the CIA's rendition of alleged 
terrorist suspects, the Administration's petition for en bane 
rehearing reasserted the state secrets privilege with no changes 
from the Bush Administration's earlier stance. To be sure, the 
petition invoked the Obama policy as a reason for rehearing. It 
noted that the request for rehearing was 
101. See Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Corp., 463 U.S. 
29, 42-45 (1983) (discussing hard look review); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, 
Cognitive Psychology and Optimal Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549, 587-
89 (2002) (noting that a hard look review requires an agency "to articulate the factors it 
considers relevant to its decision, engage in some perceptible assessment of alternative 
courses of action, and respond to meaningful comments by outsiders"). 
102. Rachlinski & Farina, supra note 101, at 588-89; Seidenfeld, supra note 88, at 
508-25. 
103. Opsahl, supra note 73 (" [A]ll the Executive Branch has promised here is that it 
will check with itself before invoking the state secrets privilege. What's needed instead is 
a policy that ensures that the separation of powers is restored-that a court can ensure 
that the secrecy is warranted and, if necessary, that a case be dismissed because so much 
secrecy is needed.") (emphasis in original). When questioned about this omission, DOJ 
officials stated that sharing such evidence with courts was presumed by the policy. 
Aftergood, supra note 87. As discussed in the text, however, it is not clear whether the 
Obama administration will live up to this presumption. 
2010] STATE SECRETS & ACCOUNTABILITY 
based upon the most careful and deliberative consideration, at 
the highest levels, of all possible alternatives to relying upon 
the state secrets privilege. As the President made clear two 
weeks ago, while the state secrets privilege is necessary to 
protect against national security, the United States will not 
invoke the privilege to prevent disclosure of "the violation of 
I b � a aw or em arrassment of the government." 
647 
Yet nowhere does the brief provide further information as to the 
nature of those "possible alternatives" considered and discarded. 
The Administration filed no additional affidavits to support its 
petition. Rather, it relied on the affidavit of the former CIA 
director filed during the Bush Administration's invocation of the 
privilege and the statement that his conclusions "have been 
reinforced by additional review-following the panel decision in 
this case-at the highest levels of the Department of Justice."105 
In other words, the court must trust the Obama Administration's 
assertion that Mohamed involves a special case under the new 
policy. 
Perhaps it does. One can certainly foresee cases for which 
the state secrets privilege was ideally created. Many of them 
probably involve the CIA. But the Administration's petition 
does nothing to suggest that it has thought about the uniqueness 
of this particular case. Instead, as with the Bush Administration, 
it seeks dismissal at the pleading stage because the very subject 
matter of the case is a state secret.106 As the Ninth Circuit panel 
observed in Mohamed, the Obama Administration's argument 
essentially amounts to the notion that "state secrets form the 
subject matter of a lawsuit, and therefore require dismissal, any 
time a complaint contains allegations, the truth or falsity of 
which has been classified as secret by a government official. "10 7  
Such assertions are broad, vague and, when made at the pleading 
stage, have little to do with specific discussion of the costs and 
benefits associated with actual evidentiary issues. They certainly 
do not fit within the accountability framework described above 
in that the Obama Administration has never justified its decision 
to re-assert the privilege, described the specific harms likely to 
104. Petition for Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc at 1 ,  Mohamed v. Jeppesen 
Dataplan, Inc., 563 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2009) (No. 5:07-cv-02798), available at 
http://www.aclunc.org/cases/ active _cases/ mohamed_ v .j eppesen_dataplan,_inc.shtml. 
105. Id. at 1-2. 
106. Id. at 2 ("[P]ermitting this suit to proceed would pose an unacceptable risk to 
national security."). 
107. Mohamed, 563 F.3d at 1003. 
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ensue, or listed the possible alternatives to dismissal.10 8 Its 
assertion of the privilege in at least two other cases follows a 
similar pattern.10 9 
If nothing in the Obama policy or subsequent actions 
suggests that the Administration will hold itself accountable, 
courts' inconsistency in applying the privilege presents further 
problems. As noted in Section II, the state secrets privilege is 
simply too malleable in its current iteration to force the kind of 
accountability discussed above. Although many courts eschew 
the "subject matter argument,"110 enough of them adopt it or 
related rhetoric to provide ammunition for Administration 
officials seeking dismissal at the pleading stage. Hence, 
government officials litigating Mohamed could point: (1) to 
another rendition case, El-Masri v. Tenet,111 where a federal 
court dismissed the lawsuit based upon the subject matter 
argument; and (2) a Ninth Circuit case that only arguably 
dismissed based upon that theory.112 Furthermore, even those 
108. One would not expect terribly specific information to appear in public 
documents, and the allegations in CIA Director Hayden's public affidavit are quite vague 
and pro forma. Thus, the Director claimed that allowing the case to go forward risked 
disclosing "information" that would pose serious or potentially grave danger to national 
security, including: (1) information that would tend to confirm or deny whether Jeppesen 
or other private entities assisted the CIA; (2) information that would tend to confirm or 
deny that foreign governments assisted the CIA; (3) information about the scope and 
operation of the CIA's terrorist detention program (including locations, methods of 
interrogation and identities of detainees), and (4) any other information about CIA 
clandestine activities. Redacted, Unclassified Brief for Intervenor-Appellee the United 
States at 5-6, Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 586 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 2009) (No. 
08-15693) ,  2008 WL 4973859 (citing the Hayden unclassified affidavit). The 
Government's brief (which references Director Hayden's affidavit) does not attempt to 
explain exactly how or to what extent the lawsuit would result in such revelations, nor 
does it attempt to identify specific information that would result in such revelations. 
Rather, it merely asserts conclusions. 
Perhaps the classified affidavit fills in those gaps. The Ninth Circuit, however, made 
its decision with full access to the classified and supposedly more detailed affidavit. It 
nevertheless concluded that the government's assertion of the privilege was too vague 
and that dismissal was warranted. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
109. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
110. See, e.g. , Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 57 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 
2007). 
1 11 .  El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530 (E.D. Va. 2006). 
1 12. See, e.g. , Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1 159 (9th Cir. 1998). In Kasza, the court 
actually dismissed the case during the discovery stage based on plaintiffs' inability to 
make a prima facie case. Id. at 1 170. However, it also noted that because "the very 
subject matter of [plaintiff's] action is a state secret, we agree with the district court that 
her action must be dismissed." Id. This aspect of Kasza's rhetoric has been influential in 
later cases. The Ninth Circuit panel in Mohamed limited Kasza's reach, rejecting the 
argument that Kasza involved or recognized subject matter dismissals beyond Totten's 
narrow context. Jeppesen, 563 F.3d at 1002 n.5 (describing Kasza as a case involving 
dismissal based on plaintiffs' inability to prove her prima facie case). 
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courts that do not dismiss based upon a subject matter theory 
occasionally dismiss at the pleadings stage because litigants will 
not be able to prove their prima facie case.113 Dismissals at such 
an early stage, however, are akin to subject matter dismissals and 
consider little, if any, evidence as part of the decision.114 
If courts are to apply the state secrets privilege in a manner 
consistent with explanatory accountability, changes are in order. 
Suggesting comprehensive changes is beyond the scope of this 
Essay, but it is worth brief note that pending congressional 
legislation, if passed, could move us toward such 
accountability.11 5 The State Secrets Protection Act116 would 
require courts to tighten the existing privilege in several ways, 
although it also adopts aspects of the Obama policy, such as the 
requirement that the government show the information to be 
disclosed would be "reasonably likely to cause significant harm 
to the national defense or the diplomatic relations of the United 
States."117 Not surprisingly, the Act also adopts aspects of the 
existing privilege, allowing the government to assert the 
privilege in lawsuits, whether or not a party, and to support that 
assertion with affidavits.11 8 
However, the Act also requires courts to undertake 
preliminary review of the material over which the privilege is 
asserted either through review of the material itself or detailed 
indices of the material, which should accompany the typical 
113. See, e.g. , Terkel v. AT&T Corp., 441 F. Supp. 2d 899, 917 (N.D. Ill. 2006). 
1 14. See supra notes 61-62. 
1 15. That legislation also provides the additional advantage of congressional 
oversight of executive action. As Professor Frost has noted, congressional exercise of 
control over federal court jurisdiction can "bolster the democratic legitimacy of judicial 
decision making." Frost, supra note 3, at 1952. Further, by defining the parameters of the 
state secrets privilege, Congress and courts can coordinate executive oversight, thus 
serving important separation of powers functions. Frost, supra note 3, at 1953. 
Of course, Congress may also serve as an independent accountability mechanism by 
generally requiring executive officials to share information regarding clandestine 
activities, see Clark, supra note 25; Heidi Kitrosser, Congressional Oversight of National 
Security Activities: Improving Information Funnels, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1049 (2008), or 
by specifically requiring information regarding assertions of the privilege, see State 
Secrets Protection Act, H.R. 984, l llth Cong. § 9 (2009) (requiring the Attorney General 
to report use of privilege to various congressional committees). Scholars express some 
doubt as to whether the Obama Administration will share intelligence information 
willingly, although the Obama policy specifically calls for congressional notification. See, 
e.g. , Kathleen Clark, A New Era of Openness?: Disclosing Intelligence To Congress 
Under Obama, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 313 ,  313  (2010); Holder Memorandum, supra note 
18, at 4. 
1 16. H.R. 984. 
117. Id. §§ 2, 6( d) (discussing standard and burden of proof). 
118. Id. § 4. 
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affidavits.119 Such detailed description or actual review of the 
material would go far toward allowing courts to adequately 
assess claims that information poses a danger to national security 
(although some scholars argue persuasively for requiring in 
camera production of actual materials in a greater number of 
cases ).120 If the court determines that a privilege assertion is 
valid, the Act also requires a determination as to whether a non­
privileged substitute is possible, thus allowing the case to 
proceed. If the government refuses, the court can impose 
sanctions and find against the government on the issues to which 
the privileged information is relevant.121 Such requirements alert 
the government that it must seek paths other than total secrecy, 
and that officials may be punished for failing to adequately 
account for those possible alternatives. The Act's bar on 
granting motions to dismiss or summary judgment motions until 
non-government parties have had an adequate opportunity to 
participate in "non-privileged discovery" further reins in the 
current amorphous nature of the privilege by eliminating 
dismissals at the pleading stage based on little or no evidence of 
harm.122 Accordingly, government officials must make specific 
arguments regarding evidence and issues that are more likely to 
hold them accountable, rather than blanket arguments for 
secrecy. The Act, then, provides courts with many of the tools to 
act as accountability mechanisms regarding assertions of the 
state secrets privilege, while still maintaining secrecy when 
necessary. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the Obama policy is a positive first step, it is 
currently little more than a symbolic gesture. At a time when 
individual liberties and lives are at stake, we deserve more than 
empty rhetoric and assurances regarding the Administration's 
desire for greater accountability regarding state secrets. Real 
accountability depends upon a willingness to actually justify 
one's actions to others. Much needs to change-both in the 
Obama policy and in the court's application of the state secrets 
privilege-for that kind of accountability to come about. 
119. Id. § 5(a) , (c). There is also the possibility of use of special masters in certain 
cases. Id. § 5(b ) . 
120. Fuchs, supra note 12, at 171-75; Telman, supra note 3, at 519-20, Yamaoka, 
supra note 51 ,  at 156-60. 
121. H.R. 984 § 7(b) . 
122. Id. § 7(c). 
